consciousness and some degree of rationality. 8 But he does not say whether having this minimum level of psychological capacities is equivalent to having a certain minimum level or strength of time-relative interests. The assumption that having a minimum level of psychological capacities is equivalent to having a minimum level of time-relative interests implies that an individual with a minimum level of psychological capacities will always have stronger time-relative interests than a being who has less than the minimum level of psychological capacities. This means, for example, that an old human person who has the minimum level of psychological capacities but who only has a few minutes to live will still have stronger time-relative interests than a normal healthy animal, e.g. a dog, who has less than the minimum level of psychological capacities. Independent of our discussion, this assumption and its implication seem to me to be correct because although the dog's future life will contain vastly more good, the old human person who will die in a few minutes still has a very strong time-relative interest in avoiding death in a few minutes, that is, he has a very strong time-relative interest in living for many more years. It is true that his interest in continuing to live will be frustrated but it is still an interest that he has and it seems that it would be stronger than any interest the dog might have.
In any case, this assumption is important for our purpose because if the two thresholds -the minimum level of psychological capacities and the minimum level of time-relative interests -were not equivalent, then the Time-Relative Interest Account of the wrongness of killing would not be providing the justification for the permissibility of abortion. Abortion would be permissible because embryos and fetuses have less than the minimum level of psychological capacities, and not on account of the strengths of their time-relative interests.
If the two thresholds were equivalent, then the Time-Relative Interest of the wrongness of killing could provide a justification for the permissibility of abortion, because the embryos' and fetuses' having less than the minimum level of psychological capacities is equivalent to their having less than the minimum level of time-relative interests, and on the Time-Relative Interest Account of the wrongness of killing, killing embryos and fetuses via abortion is therefore less wrong given that they have less than the minimum level of time-relative interests, other things being equal.
Since we are interested in knowing whether the concept of a time-relative interest can be used to justify the permissibility of abortion, since some writers such as DeGrazia have explicitly used this concept to justify some forms of abortion, and since, as I have said, the assumption that the two thresholds are equivalent has independent plausibility, we should assume, for the purpose of this paper, that the two thresholds are indeed equivalent, that is, having the minimum level of psychological capacities is equivalent to having the minimum level of time-relative interests. 9 Given this assumption, a case for the Time-Relative Account of abortion can be presented as follows:
(1) Killing is more wrong and less permissible when it is an offense against persons. Call this 'the morality of respect for persons' or 'morality of respect,' for short.
(2) Outside of the morality of respect, killing is less wrong and may be more permissible. That is, such an act may be weighed and traded off in a "manner 9 In personal correspondence, McMahan accepts that this assumption could be consistent with his view.
approved by consequentialists" 10 and such an act is not "directly subject to or opposed by a deontological constraint."
11
(3) To be within the morality of respect, a being must have a certain minimum level of time-relative interests.
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(4) Embryos/fetuses have less than the minimum level of time-relative interests.
(5) Therefore, killing embryos/fetuses is not governed by the morality of respect.
(6) Therefore, killing embryos/fetuses via abortion is less wrong and may be more McMahan offers three suggestions. First, he points out that a newborn infant is exposed at birth to a large amount of external stimuli, which impels its mind to operate at a higher level, thereby accelerating its psychological development. 19 As a result, the infant's time-relative interest in continuing to live will be stronger than when it was a fetus.
However, that a newborn infant is exposed at birth to a large amount of external stimuli may just be a contingent fact. For, we can imagine that after birth, an infant is placed and raised in a dark room in which external stimuli are minimized. Infanticide would not be more acceptable just because the newborn infant is now less stimulated psychologically.
But let us suppose that being born inevitably causes the newborn infant's mind to be additionally stimulated. The issue is here whether the newborn will achieve a level of time-relative interests that is higher than that of normal animals such as dogs. It should be obvious that immediately after birth, it is doubtful that a newborn infant would McMahan's second suggestion is that at birth a newborn infant begins actively to form special relations with the parents and others in ways in which it is not possible for a fetus. According to McMahan, the special relations may "magnify the reason these people have not to frustrate its time-relative interest in continuing to live." 20 First, it is worth mentioning that developing fetuses can also actively form some special relations with the parents and others. At late stages of a pregnancy, a fetus may kick back when its foot is touched and may respond to music and other kinds of sounds from parents and others. Secondly, when someone is contemplating infanticide, it is unlikely that they would try to form special bonds with the newborn infant. If so, in such a case, it is unlikely that there would be much stronger special relations to the infant after it was born than before it was born. This means that while special relations may explain why some people do not kill their newborns, for people who are thinking about killing their newborn, it does not seem to provide any reason why they should not do so.
Finally, it is hard to see how special relations at an early stage of infancy could drastically change a newborn's time-relative interests. If it does not, then it remains the case that the newborn does not have significantly stronger time-relative interests than the fetus. If so, the Time-Relative Interest Account still seems to entail the permissibility of infanticide.
McMahan's third suggestion is that the reasons favoring killing a fetus are often stronger than in the case of infanticide. He points to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument that the fetus inside the pregnant woman's body is dependent on the continued use of her body for survival, which can be quite burdensome and invasive to the pregnant woman.
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Newborns on the other hand exist independently and the sacrifices they may require from others for their survival may be of a fundamentally different kind and possibly less Embodied Mind Account may still employ a version of the identity argument to defend early abortion. In particular, some people believe that we begin to exist only when twinning is no longer possible. 30 Since the possibility of twinning ends sometime after fertilization, it follows that early abortion, as defined by the period during which twinning is still possible, would be permissible, using the identity argument.
Elsewhere I have argued that the Embodied Mind Account is false, that we should accept the Organism View, and that on the most plausible Organism View, we exist before the possibility of twinning ends, namely, at the moment of fertilization. 31 I
shall not repeat those arguments here, and I shall simply say that on this particular
Organism View, an early abortion would still be killing one of us.
The second, more serious problem with the identity argument is that if it were valid, it seems that this argument would be sufficient to establish the permissibility of early abortion. If so, it would render the Time-Relative Interest Account unnecessary.
Indeed, as I said earlier, McMahan himself does not defend early abortion using the Interest Account would no longer imply that late abortion is permissible, since the difference between a newborn and a late term fetus is, as we have seen, not significant.
However, it might nevertheless enable one to argue that early abortion is permissible, for the following reason: Even after drastically lowering the level required to be within the morality of respect, 'early fetuses' -defined as fetuses that have not yet developed the capacity for consciousness -will still not meet it, even if they are one of us, so that an appeal to the identity argument is not necessary. This is because early fetuses utterly lack any psychological connection with their later selves, and therefore utterly lack any psychological capacity. Given this, on this revised Time-Relative Interest Account, the killing of early fetuses would therefore not be governed by the morality of respect. If so, the killing of early fetuses via early abortion should be permissible. Indeed, David
DeGrazia says that "the utter lack of psychological unity between the presentient fetus and later minded being it could become justifies a radical discounting of the harm of the Moreover, suppose the choice now is between a normal adult dog and a newborn human infant. As we said earlier, normal adult dogs have much stronger time-relative interests than newborn human infants. On the Differential Worth View, it seems therefore that the dog has greater worth than the newborn infant, other things being equal. If so, killing the newborn would not be as bad as killing the dog; or if confronted with the choice of saving the dog or the newborn, other things being equal, it seems that one should save the dog instead of the infant. Again, these implications seem counterintuitive.
Some might be tempted to resist this last example by arguing that even though the newborn has weaker present time-relative interests than the dog, the newborn's total valuable future will be greater than the dog's. The unstated conclusion here is that after taking into account this factor, the newborn will have a greater worth than the dog, thereby diffusing the counterintuitiveness of the Differential Worth View.
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First,
whether the newborn will have greater valuable future than the dog is a contingent matter. We can stipulate that the newborn has a serious genetic disease and that it will die before its total valuable future or the strength of its time-relative interests is greater than that of the dog. Even so, it still seems absurd to think that killing the dog is worse than killing this newborn. Secondly, even supposing that we are concerned with the typical case in which the newborn will have greater valuable future than the dog, this argument involves a measure of confusion. The concept of a time-relative interest is a theory about how to aggregate well-being over time. Account to say that early abortion is permissible, the consequences of the idea that killing animals like dogs are governed by the morality of respect for persons seem unacceptable.
Let me suggest another argument against this proposal, which could be controversial. 38 While it is true that early fetuses lack time-relative interests altogether, it is also the case that late fetuses really do not have much of them either. Indeed, the 37 See Broome, Weighing Lives, pp. 249-251 for this point. 38 If someone finds this argument unpersuasive, there is still the first argument above.
degree to which a late fetus, which has just (a few hours ago) acquired the capacity for generating consciousness, can be psychologically invested in its future seems hardly significant when compared to an early fetus. Given this, and given, as has been granted earlier, that both are one of us, it seems highly questionable that the early fetus' utter lack of any time-relative interest should matter so much such that the killing of it would be permissible while the killing of the late fetus would not be. Indeed, it seems that the treatment of either should be the same. So, either it should be permissible to kill both or it should not be. Since we have argued that it is not permissible to kill late fetuses on the revised Time-Relative Interest Account, it seems that it should also not be permissible to kill early fetuses on this account.
To develop this point further, consider an analogy. Suppose there is a human being in persistent vegetative state (PVS) and another in deep coma. 39 In the case of the PVS patient, the 'higher' cerebral brain is completely damaged. This means that he utterly lacks the biological structures necessary for having consciousness, which therefore means that he utterly lacks any time-relative interest. In the case of the deep coma patient, the reticular formation, which is needed for controlling arousal in the cerebral hemispheres, is permanently damaged, but the cerebrum is on the whole intact.
This means that arguably, the deep coma patient still has some time-relative interests, albeit very weak ones, since the physical substrate of the mind is preserved and potentially functional. 40 Let us suppose that the organisms of both continue to function on their own without respirators. Moreover, let us suppose, quite plausibly in my view, 39 For a good discussion of these two cases along the lines I am suggesting, 42 Also, given this assumption, the not uncontroversial view that we die when our "higher brain," i.e. our cerebrum, dies would be ruled out). 43 The important question for us here is that given that the PVS and the deep coma patient are both one of us, but given that the PVS patient utterly lacks any time-relative interest, while the deep coma patient has just a bit of time-relative interests left, does this difference justify a very different treatment of the two such that, for example, it would be permissible to kill the PVS patient while it would not be permissible to kill the deep coma patient?
My conjecture is that there should be no difference morally in the way one treats the two cases. Indeed, some people believe that it would be wrong to kill the deep coma patient, and that it might also be wrong to allow the deep coma patient to die, unless the patient has previously expressed an autonomous preference to be allowed to die in such circumstances. 44 If they believe this, and if they believe that both the PVS and the deep coma patient are one of us, then they should also believe that it is wrong to kill the PVS patient, and that it might also be wrong to allow the PVS patient to die, unless the patient has previously expressed an autonomous preference to be allowed to die in such circumstances.
Others such as Peter Singer and James Rachel have argued that the fact that the PVS patient and the deep coma patient are alive does not in itself tell us whether it is wrong to take their lives. 45 Since they believe that it is permissible to kill the PVS patient in certain circumstances, they should also believe that it is permissible to kill a deep coma patient in similar circumstances. In fact, Singer has argued that there is no principled reason why it would be wrong to take the lives of either, given that neither has the capacity for consciousness. 46 So, for Singer, the treatment of either would be the same, even though one utterly lacks any time-relative interest while the other one has some measure of time-relative interests. Also, McMahan, who sees a metaphysical difference between the two cases in terms of time-relative interests, nevertheless says that "Although deep coma is fundamentally different from PVS in metaphysical terms, it may not be much different prudentially or morally . . . patients in a deep coma should be treated in much the same way that we ought to treat patients in a PVS." 47 This suggests that the difference between the PVS and the deep coma patient in terms of time-relative interests does not justify a very different treatment of the two such that, for example, it would be permissible to kill the PVS patient while it would not be permissible to kill the deep coma patient. If I am right, given that this case parallels the early/late fetus case, it seems that the difference between the early and late fetus in terms of time-relative interests also should not justify a very different treatment of the two. If so, and given that the revised Time-Relative Interest Account does not permit late abortion, then it should also not permit early abortion.
Conclusion
The concept of a time-relative interest is useful for solving certain puzzles about the badness of death. Some people believe that the concept can also be used to show that abortion is permissible. In this paper, I first argued that if abortion were permissible on the basis of the Time-Relative Interest Account, then infanticide would also be permissible on the same basis. The implausibility of infanticide suggests that we should also question the plausibility of the Time-Relative Interest Account. I next considered and rejected the suggestion that the Time-Relative Interest Account can at least explain the permissibility of early abortion, even if it has implausible implications when applied to late abortion. If I am right, abortion, whether early or late, has to be justified on grounds other than time-relative interests.
